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This overview ofthe history ofthe idea ofevolution includes the work ofmany European
scholars often omitted from such accounts, particularly in the United States. It provides a
case study in the origin of cultural tensions, owing to the attempts of some scientists and
theologians, without sufficient interdisciplinary understanding, to undermine public confi-
dence in each other's proper authority.
In the ongoing fight concerning the con-
cept of evolution as a description of the re-
ality of the universe, a large number of mis-
understandings remain as to what should be
considered a part of evolution and what is
just part of a special theory of evolution.
Before turning to the history of the concept
of evolution, it seems necessary, at least to
me, to clarify that this concept is not neces-
sarily linked with a definite theory of evolu-
tion. Evolution in its general sense is nei-
ther Lamarckian nor Darwinian (explana-
tions below); rather, it is only a descriptive
term stating that everything within the uni-
verse has come forth through a process of
becoming. Becoming in this context desig-
nates not simply the process known in biol-
ogy as ontogenesis: the transformation of
the highly densified information contained
in a zygote into a living being of the same
kind, a process that does not produce any-
thing really new. Evolution, on the contrary,
means exactly this: the appearance of new
realities that did not exist before a particular
point in time, through a process of becom-
ing. The concept of evolution in its most
general meaning thus states that the more
comes forth from the less. This applies not
only to the history of becoming from the pro-
tozoa to Homo sapiens, ' but to the history
of science and knowing, as well. The his-
tory of the idea of evolution is itself a good
example of evolution.
The development of the idea of evolu-
tion is linked with the history of the concep-
tion of becoming. In striving for continuity,
for stability, for security, for eternity—as it
was expressed in very early funeral rites
—
human beings resented the idea that becom-
ing should be of fundamental importance.
The Eastern philosophers solved the "prob-
lem" of becoming by ascribing futility to all
the outcomes of this process, declaring it to
be Maya, just appearance. Only the return
to the "eternal one." the divine whole or nir-
vana, which absorbs all individuality, is nec-
essary for a meaningful existence. Falling
into the world of Maya and re-ascending to
the true world of the "eternal one" are the
two aspects of a cyclic process, in which be-
coming is, at best, of secondary importance.
Similar cyclic visions were developed in
Taoism, e.g.. in the belief that all things
"come from the originative process of Na-
ture and return to the originative process of
Nature." 2 Later on, the book of I Ching.
which was written under Taoist influence,
introduced the cyclic principle of yin and
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yang, both produced by the Great Original
One. With this background, it is understand-
able why modern Chinese thinking did not
turn to Darwin and the idea of evolution.
Their expository textbooks on the world of
Western thought mention names like Spen-
cer, Huxley, Kropotkin, Bergson and the pro-
cess philosophers, 1 but not Darwin.
In the Occident, the idea of evolution is
at least implicitly contained within the
cosmologies of the pre-Socratics. Thales
(6th-7th century b.c.e.) had everything
evolve out of the water. Anaximander (6th
century b.c.e.) taught that the lineage that
started with initial slime and led finally to
the human being, had to pass, for example,
through the stage of fishes. Xenophanes (6th
century b.c.e.) recognized the fossils to be
the remains of a once-living, but different,
flora and fauna. The idea of a kind of gen-
eral evolution out of prefabricated pails was
developed by Empedocles (5th century
b.c.e.). In his view, most accidental struc-
tures were discarded because they were not
viable; in other words, the viable ones were
selected. The explanation of the appearance
of living forms through chance and selec-
tion is not, in fact, a very modern theory.
When Pannenides (6th century b.c.e.),
and in his footsteps Plato and Aristotle, made
the idea of being the center of their meta-
physics, this early start to thinking the world
to be radically within the horizon of becom-
ing was lost. To Aristotle—and with him
the Middle Ages and modern times 4—be-
coming was essentially only the reconstitu-
tion of a past state of matter. Becoming, in
this worldview, is repetition—the reproduc-
tion of something that has already existed.
Within such a vision, everything is contained
in the beginnings, and anything really new
cannot come into being. Certainly, there
were other attempts to go beyond the phi-
losophers' principle of being, and to under-
stand becoming in its property to produce
really new forms of being. The atomists,
known through the didactic poem De natura
rerum by Titus Lucretius Carus (99-55
b.c.e.), are the most prominent example. For
Lucretius the human race originated in natu-
ral processes, first by pure chance and se-
lection. Its evolution started with primitives
living in caves, passed through a culture of
hunters and gatherers, produced civilization
that mastered metallurgy, and finally reached
the high culture of the Roman Golden Age.
Lucretius had only minor influence on the
thinking of the following centuries, which
were dominated by neo-Platonism, by the
Stoa, and later on by Aristotelianism. But
often the fact is overlooked that there was a
Lucretius-renaissance at the beginning of
modern times, which spread the ideas of the
atomists, mostly through clandestine
groups. 5
Among the Arabs, Avicenna (980-1037
c.e.), whose influence on occidental think-
ing is well known, presented the idea that
the human race had its origins in an earlier
form of animal. In considering Avicenna's
mystical interpretation of the universe, a defi-
nite theory of becoming should not be ex-
pected. Picking up Plotinic ideas, he thought
in terms of the emanation of the multiple
from the one and the return of the multiple
to the one. The ideas of Avicenna are remi-
niscent as of Hindu cosmology, as well as of
the speculations of Nicholas of Cusa or of
Teilhard de Chardin, at least in consideration
of the return of the multiple to the one.''
In the Christian world of the West, the
biblical story of creation was taken to be an
historical report on the appearance of the
species. It is certainly not a mistake to sup-
pose that this understanding of the text by
the vast majority of thinking people was not
very helpful in furthering the idea of evolu-
tion. The experience of Galilei, who tried
with insufficient proof to impose the helio-
centric cosmos, shows how difficult it is to
think in a way other than that of the vast ma-
jority. As far as the cosmic time frame is
concerned, scholars relied on the dates of the
Bible. They calculated the movements of
the stars, the planets, and the sun quite ex-
actly for each day of this universe—though
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they evidently missed the fact that the uni-
verse did not start on Day Zero, as calcu-
lated. As late as 1852, the Oxford Univer-
sity Press published a set of tables, indicat-
ing the times of sunrise and sundown, start-
ing with the sundown of Day One, 24 April
of the year a.m., 7 or 4005 b.c.e.
Given this very restricted time frame in
the mind of most people of the time, it is
surprising to find that Leonardo da Vinci
( 1452-15 19), on the basis of his observations
of Alpine marine fossils—which he recog-
nized as such, started to reflect on the pro-
cess of sedimentation, mineralization, and
natural erosion. As a result of his specula-
tions, he proposed a minimum age of
200,000 years for the earth, a proposition
some people might have considered highly
dangerous. As a brilliant observer he also
noticed the similarity between apes and men s
—two hundred years before Linnaeus and
Lamarck.
The idea of a kind ofgeneral evolution
out ofprefabricated parts was developed
by Empedocles. In his view, most acci-
dental structures were discarded because
they were not viable; in other words, the
viable ones were selected. The explana-
tion of the appearance of livingforms
through chance and selection is not, in
fact, a very modern theory.
Giordano Bruno (15487-1600), who
was a very controversial man in his time,
and who is today often celebrated as a "mar-
tyr of science," believed in the eternity and
infinity of the universe (the influence of
Lucretius). According to Bruno, the spiri-
tually endowed matter within the universe
deployed itself creatively in its becoming.
It is questionable whether his ideas can be
said to be evolutionary, since his vision was
strictly cyclical. At any rate, the time was
not yet ripe for such an idea, even among
the most prominent scientists. This becomes
evident when turning to Carl Linnaeus
(1707-1778) who, in 1735 and 1766, pub-
lished the first comprehensive classification
of the flora and the fauna since Aristotle. He
introduced the system of binomial classifi-
cation, which allowed every living being to
be classified according to its genus and spe-
cies—the same classification system still in
use. though somewhat refined. Human be-
ings were classified by Linnaeus among the
primates as Homo sapiens. This has been
refined to Homo sapiens sapiens to differ-
entiate today's humanity from earlier hu-
man forms.
In the nineteenth century. Linnaeus' clas-
sification became one of the principal argu-
ments in favor of evolution, and it still is to-
day. Linnaeus himself was absolutely alien
to such an idea, convinced that his system
described the species just as they sprang from
the hand of God in the first
days of creation.
A French contemporary
of Linnaeus, Pierre Louis
Moreau de Maupertuis
( 1698-1759). influenced by
Lucretius, developed the
idea of selection and chance
changes, the same as chance
mutations. Such chance
changes might, through al-
teration in environmental
and geographical condi-
tions, explain anatomical
changes in a species, if
enough time were allowed. He employed
probability calculus to reason his theory of
heredity in an empirical study of albinism
and polydactylism. 1 ' Neither in its method
nor in its theory has modern neo-Darwin-
ism reached better models of explanation
than that of Maupertuis.
In his Histoive naturelle, Georges Louis
Leclerc Comte de Buffon (1717-1788)."'
another contemporary of Linnaeus, ex-
plained that species do change and conse-
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quently bring forth new species. According
to his view, all species may have evolved
from a single species existing in the distant
past. He found support for this hypothesis
in the parallelism of organs and the involu-
tion of organs. Buffon did not offer a theory
of evolution—which in my opinion makes
him superior to the neo-Darwinists—but this
deficit was certainly not the reason for the
condemnation of his doctrine by the theolo-
gians of the Sorbonne.
Button did not limit his ideas about evo-
lution to the realm of living species. He
linked the appearance of the planets with a
solar event in which a big comet hit the liq-
uid surface of the sun, flinging out into space
a sort of matter-fog that contained the mass
of the future planets. He constructed a his-
tory of the earth that is very close to present
ideas in geological dimensions. Based on
the fossil layers, whose specificity was clear
to him, he distinguished seven epochs, each
of which was measured in millions of years.
This, for the theologians of his time, was an
absolutely unacceptable idea; only recall the
time frames mentioned above.
Johann Friedrich Blumenbach (1752-
1840), while not explicitly a forerunner of
Science has adopted a very ahistorical way
of thinking: in its own short view of its
past, it replaces historical truth by hagio-
graphic stories. Most people have the
impression that the notion of evolution did
not really exist before Darwin.
an evolutionary understanding of reality,
made an important contribution that prepared
the ground for it. He employed compara-
tive anatomy to elaborate the morphologi-
cal differences of geographically separated
human populations. At the young age of
twenty-three, he published his thesis, which
is the starting point of physical anthropol-
ogy as the science of the natural human
diversity."
In England, the successful physician and
botanist Erasmus Darwin (1731-1802) had
formulated clearly the question of the ori-
gin of species and life. In his treatise,
Zoonomia: or the Laws of Organic Life
( 1796) he proposed the idea that all life de-
veloped from one primordial filament exist-
ing on the surface of the earth—an evolu-
tion that had started many millions of years
in the past and was not yet finished. Erasmus
Darwin, like many of his romantic contem-
poraries, speculated on a future open for the
evolution of some kind of superhuman be-
ing.
It is astonishing that practically all these
names linked with the history of the idea of
evolution—and I did not mention them all
—
are omitted from the textbooks that teach
about this topic. Science has adopted a very
ahistorical way of thinking : in its own short
view of its past, it replaces historical truth
by hagiographic stories. Most people have
the impression that the notion of evolution
did not really exist before Darwin. Perhaps
Erasmus Darwin receives an occasional
mention, but only because he was Charles
Darwin's grandfather.
The other man men-
tioned is Jean Baptiste
Pierre Antoine de Monet,
Chevalier de Lamarck
(1744-1829), the "pet
hate" of the Darwinists.
Without any doubt, he
was the first to try to de-
velop a viable theory of
the biological evolution.
He was educated for the office of clergy, as
was Darwin; but after a short time in the
army, he turned toward science, first to me-
teorology and then to botany and zoology.
As a botanist he elaborated a new analytical
system of classification. 12 Professor of zo-
ology at the Jardin des Plantes in Paris, he
introduced the differentiation between the in-
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vertebrates and the vertebrates; and he dis-
tinguished the groups of Crustacea. Arach-
nids and Annelida. 13 This highly important
work of his is rarely mentioned today.
Everybody, however, knows about the
first modern theory of descent, which
Lamarck developed in his Philosophic
zoologique. The rather vulgarized descrip-
tion of this theory as the inheritance of ac-
quired qualities makes it an easy target for
Darwinists. Lamarck's doctrine is much
more differentiated, in fact. It distinguished
between what is known as function-Lama-
rckism (whereby an organ is developed by
use and is lost by nonuse ) and psycho-Lama-
rckism (whereby new qualities of existing
organs may appear by a "need" for them).
A real refutation of Lamarck's ideas has yet
to be proposed, though Darwinists have a
habit of citing the experiments by August
Weismann. He experimented with cutting
the tails off mice for many generations, and
wondered that their progeny continued to be
born with tails. These experiments fail to
consider, however, the essential points of
Lamarck's theory: cutting off the tails nei-
ther takes away their function nor does it
create a "need." The question is still open. 14
Nevertheless, Darwin had an easy mark
in the theories of Lamarck, whose work he
mentions only briefly. The old Anglo-Saxon/
French rivalry in science was in favor of
Darwin. (Newton versus Descartes is another
example: Robert C. Gallo" versus Luc
Montagnier"' is a more recent one; yet an-
other is Stanford versus CERN, over the con-
firmation of the Z-boson (Z °). Besides that,
even in his lifetime Lamarck was a whipped
dog—and easy to continue to whip. His su-
perior at the Jardin des Plantes. George
Baron de Cuvier (1769-1832), made his life
hell. He did not want to share the opinions
of his competitor. The fact that Cuvier. from
1 822 on. was also the supervisor of the Prot-
estant theological faculties in France may in-
dicate the sources of the resistance against
the rather revolutionary ideas of Lamarck.
Both Cuvier and Lamarck were fully aware
of the fossil evidence and they did not have
any essential disagreement in the zoologi-
cal field. 17 Based on the fossil evidence,
Cuvier developed the idea of consecutive
"eons." each one ending in a catastrophe, the
evidence for which is found in the fossil
record. The recolonization of the earth by a
new fauna could start in either of two ways:
1 ) the migration of surviving species from
other regions unaffected by the catastrophe.
or 2) by divine re-creation. Cuvier viewed
the latter to be the more probable.
This interpretation shows Cuvier quite
in line with the tradition of the physico-theo-
logians. who tried to prove God the Creator
from the evidence in complex anatomical
structures, in the behavior of animals, and
even in stones. The most prominent name
in this field is William Paley. whose Natu-
ral Theology was rather a latecomer after the
Insecto-Theologia by Friedrich Christian
Lesser 18 and other continental authors. But
in his time. Cuvier was referenced not only
by other workers in science, but by the large
majority of philosophers, as well.
Emmanuel Kant, after having elaborated
the reasons to accept the idea of evolution
of living beings, had this to say about the
hypothesis:
...a risky adventure of reason: and
there might be only few, even among
the most ingenious scientists, who
have never have it cross their mind.
For you cannot say it is senseless, as
is the generatio cequivoca, where-
with we understand the production
of an organized being through the
mechanism of raw unorganized
matter. It would still be generatio
univoca in the most general meaning
of this term, inasmuch as only
something organic is produced out
of another organic, even though
among this kind of being something
specifically different, e.g., when
certain aquatic animals become, by
and by. amphibians: and. after some
generations, out of these land
animals arise. I9
The idea of evolution has been expressed
here in a general, but correct, manner. Re-
flecting further on it. Kant stated:
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A priori, within the judgment of
pure reason, there is no contradic-
tion. But experience does not show
us an example of this: according to
iexperience, all generation that we
know about, is generatio
homonyma, not only univoca, as
contrary to the generation out of
unorganized matter: it produces a
product which is of the same kind as
the generating being even in its
organization: and generatio
heteronyma is, as far as our
experience of nature goes, to be
found nowhere. 20
A small step from this point would have been
sufficient to reach a theologically acceptable
idea of evolution. But it is obvious that Kant
had very serious doubts about this possibil-
ity, as he expressed with the rhetorical ques-
tion, "Are you in a position to say: Hand
me matter, I will show you how to generate
a caterpillar!?" 21
In 1785, thirty years after he (anony-
mously) published Allgemeine Natur-
geschichte, Kant was still more outspoken:
The smallness of the degrees of
difference among the species is
(since the number of species is so
high) a necessary consequence out
of their number. Only a relationship
among them—such that either one
genus had sprung from another and
all from a single original genus, or
from one single generating mother's
womb—would lead to ideas that are
so monstrous that reason recoils
from them.22
Kant fully subscribed to the idea of creation
meaning the creation of each species indi-
vidually, which presupposes the creation of
at least one pair for each species. The ques-
tion, "Why is it necessary that such a pair
exists?" is answered by: "This alone makes
an organized whole, even though not within
a single, individual body." 23
Thus, in refuting the idea of evolution
Cuvier could appeal to philosophers of his
time, who are still highly respected today,
even among scientists. Hegel, who quoted
many pages of Cuvier, and Lamarck, as well,
in his Enzyklopddie der Wissenschaften, re-
jected any possibility of evolution:
Nature is essentially mindful. What
Nature forms is definite, limited, and
enters existence as such. Even
though the earth was in a state
devoid of living being, with only
chemical processes, etc., there is,
nevertheless, once the lightning of
life hits matter, immediately a
definite, completely formed being,
like Minerva jumping fully armed
from Jupiter's head. The Mosaic
story of creation is still doing it best,
when it says naively: one day the
plants came into existence, another
day the animals, and another day
humankind. Humankind did not
originate in animalkind, nor
animalkind in the plants; everything
is completely what it is at its
moment of creation. 24
Hegel's view was anti-evolutionary:
Nature is to be considered as a
system of steps, each of which
proceeds by necessity out of the
other and is the next truth of that one
out of which it results—but not in
such a way that the one would
originate naturally out of the other.
[Metamorphosis applies only to the
such a concept. J... It was a clumsy
idea of older, and even newer,
natural philosophy to consider
continued formation and the passage
of one natural form and sphere to a
higher one, as an externally efficient
production: which, inorder to make
it clearer, was relocated backwards
into the darkness of the past....
From such nebulous, basically
sensual notions, especially the so-
called "proceeding," e.g., of plants
and animals out of the water and the
"proceeding" of the more developed
animals out of the less developed
ones, etc., from such notions
intelligent consideration must
abstain.25
This anti-evolutionary position was
rather general among the leading philoso-
phers and scientists of the first decades of
the nineteenth century, and one might won-
der how it became possible for Charles
Darwin's opus. On the Origin ofSpecies, to
be immediately received by a large public. 26
Evidently, there must have been a change in
the general opinion.
In 1843-46, Robert Chambers had pub-
lished his Vestiges of the Natural History of
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Creation 27 in England. In this work, he pre-
sented a deistic and vitalistic theory of adap-
tive organic transformism (evolution) and of
cosmic development. The book is full of
factual errors, pointed out early on by Hugh
Miller and Adam Sedgwick, but this did not
hinder the book's publication in numerous
editions and translation into many languages.
Darwin himself gave rather late recognition,
in the sixth edition of his Origin ofSpecies,
to the fact that this book was of essential im-
portance in preparing the ground for his work
to be accepted:
In my opinion it has done excellent
service in this country in calling
attention to the subject, in removing
prejudice, and in thus preparing the
ground for the reception of analo-
gous views. 28
But Chambers' book alone could not ex-
plain why Darwin's ideas were received
within the philosophical and in the scientific
world. It should be recognized that science
had increasingly settled on a level of mate-
rialistic-mechanistic interpretation of real-
ity. This interpretation became added in with
a faith in the unlimited possibilities of sci-
ence, which was spread largely by popular-
izes and authors. Enlightenment attitudes
not only in France, but elsewhere as well,
had an anti-ecclesiastic and especially anti-
Catholic tendency. Many years before the
French Revolution, The Berlin Monthly 2 "
was filled with polemics against Roman
Catholics and their superstitions. The ma-
terialism of the French Encyclopedists,
Baron d'Holbach chief among them, was
widely spread among the intellectuals of the
time; religion was accepted only as a means
to domesticate the lower classes. In Ger-
many, Feuerbach ( 1804-72) opened the way
to an atheistic understanding of reality, and
at least the popularizers among the scien-
tists made these ideas their own.
There is no doubt that quite a large num-
ber of nineteenth-century natural scientists
thought themselves charged to refute faith
in God, since everything is to be explained
scientifically. In a rather naive way, Jules
Verne expressed this conviction when he had
the protagonist of his Journey to the Centre
of the Earth declare, "However great the
miracles of Nature may be, they can always
be explained by the laws of physics." This
expression of scientistic materialism—as it
would be called today—with its unshakable
faith in science, which believed itself to be
the heroic fighter against the irrational faith
in God of Christians and of all other reli-
gions in general, were represented in Ger-
many most evidently by Karl Vogt, Jakob
Moleschott and Ludwig Biichner. They were
not philosophers who, like Holbach, taught
a speculative atheistic materialism, but men
of science, of the laboratory.
Karl Vogt30 (1817-1895) was a zoolo-
gist at the University of Giessen, which he
had to leave in the context of the 1848 revo-
lution. He withdrew to Geneva, where he
worked mostly in the field of paleontology.
He is known for his violent defense of a ma-
terialistically interpreted Darwinism. A year
before Darwin published his magnum opus,
Vogt had translated Robert Chambers' Ves-
tiges of the Natural History ofCreation into
German. When Darwin's theory was pub-
lished in 1859. Vogt started preaching it,
because he considered this theory to be sup-
portive of his materialism. In his
Vorlesungen iiber den Menschen {Lectures
on Man), a curious discrepancy is found be-
tween his calmly exposited scientific argu-
ments and his controversy with the biblical
texts that is totally ignorant of the histori-
cal-critical method. This new biblical schol-
arship, at least in the Protestant world, was
already past its first steps. For Karl Vogt,
Noah's ark was a barrier to scientific devel-
opment, and it had to be surmounted. Con-
cerning Cain, he asked where his wife had
come from. And he wondered why the Ro-
man Catholic Church in Paris did not like
him! He is probably the only scientist who
managed to end a serious work of scientific
inquiry with a defiant wave of the fist against
The Boston Theological Institute 45
yapping dogs (the clergy of Paris) and the
words, "Let them bark till they can bark no
more."
"
This aggressive posture of the popular-
izes is by no means an exception among
the representatives of nineteenth-century
scientists. Thomas H. Huxley was celebrated
as the great protagonist against Bishop
Samuel Wilberforce by contemporary litera-
ture, and praised as St. George killing the
dragon Samuel Church doctrine was de-
scribed as immobile in its dogmatic state and
as unable to adapt to progressing knowledge.
Belief in God's absolute revelation was a
blockage to the progress of knowledge—an
insurmountable barrier. This combative at-
titude became most clearly exposed in John
William Draper's History ofthe Conflict be-
tween Religion and Science, a book show-
ing only black and white, and full of banali-
ties. Most readers today would discard it
quickly as nonsense. But in its time it was
one of the most frequently read books, trans-
lated into many languages: French, German,
Italian, Spanish, Polish. Russian. Portuguese
and Serbian—and quite naturally it was put
on the Index librorumprohitorum by the Ro-
man Curia (4 September 1876). It displays
the same kind of accusations against religion
that are as old as Lucretius: that the history
of the Church is marked by bloody suppres-
sion, that all knowledge is suppressed by the
Church, and that only science can free hu-
manity. Draper's faith in the liberating ef-
fect of knowledge brought forth by science,
shows a strange collection of inventions ben-
eficial to people, all due to science—and
opposed to faith, especially Roman Catholi-
cism. The following list, far from complete,
may give an idea of Draper's argumentation:
telescopes, balloons, diving bells, thermom-
eter, barometer, schools, newspapers, hos-
pitals, canals, sanitation, census reports, cot-
ton gin, medicines, manures, photography,
railways, sewing machines, rifles, and war-
ships. 32 Evidently, in this context, faith in
science is much more important than valid-
ity of arguments against Christian faith.
What does photography prove against faith?
To be honest, it must be said that most of the
scientists of Draper's day considered his ar-
guments to be nonsensical babble. But he
evidently expressed what people of his time
wanted to believe: namely, that science is
the great human liberator that will free the
race from all misery, in which the Church
—
and especially the Roman Catholic
Church—wants it to languish.
Draper, in the name of science, fought
the Roman Catholic Church relentlessly, and
there was plenty of usable material in the
texts of the Syllabus of Errors and the First
Vatican Council to show the antiscientific
stance of the Catholic Church. His picks up
on such condemning statements as these:
All truths of religions derive from
the natural potency of human
reason. It is the first parameter
according to which man may and
must all truths of any order.
Divine revelation is incomplete, and,
because of this, is submitted to a
constant progress, which must
correspond to the progress of human
reason.
34
Strict rationalists were naturally provoked
beyond bearable limits by such declarations.
Feuerbach had already recognized religion
as some kind of projection. Miracles could
not be proven by experiments; they contra-
dicted scientific insight. The Syllabus may
certainly be called opposed to science. The
antimaterialistic stance, as well, becomes
evident as in the following anathema:
Whoever is not ashamed to affirm that
there is nothing besides matter, he be
excluded. 35
The doctrine of evolution in its most gen-
eral form is condemned as a sort of panthe-
ism:
Whoever says that the physical as
well as the spiritual finite things, or
at least the spiritual ones, emanated
out of the divine substance, or the
divine essence, and by manifestation
and evolution becomes everything
or, even worse, that God is the
universal or indefinite being that
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constitutes itself by determining the
distinct universe of beings according
to genera, species and individuals:
he be excluded. 3 '1
The Roman Catholic Church clearly claimed
the right to delimit the autonomy of human
reason:
Whoever says that human reason is
independent in such a way, that God
could not command belief, he be
excluded. 37
And it is easy to understand why critical sci-
entists felt perplexed by such sentences as
the following:
Whoever says that human sciences
must be handled with such au-
tonomy that its assertions are to be
held true and may not be disaffirmed
by the church, even if they contra-
dict the revealed doctrine, he be
excluded. 3S
Whoever says that it is possible that
according to the progress of science
one might be obliged to understand
the propositions of faith defined by
the Church sometimes differently
from the meaning by which the
Church understood and understands
them, he be excluded.
31
'
Certainly such assertions coming from
the Church must be understood with rela-
tion to the attacks it was receiving, especially
those coming from the popularizers like
Draper and Vogt. Draper aired his ideas for
the first time in Oxford in 1 860 before the
British Association, while the audience was
waiting for Huxley and Wilberforce to start
then- well known debate. Vogt taught that hu-
man beings did not exercise free will and
that all thought and action were just the re-
action to preceding physical states or pro-
cesses. Such denial of human responsibil-
ity provoked a necessary response from the
moral theologians. It would be a mistake to
read the Roman Catholic teachings as a re-
action to the modern sciences of the nine-
teenth century. Rather, they have to be seen
as reactions to the materialistic ideological
usurpation of scientific knowledge, a usur-
pation that itself pretended to be scientific.
Vogt did not need Darwin's theory, even
though he judged it to be very useful as a
contribution for the defense of his ideas.
Jakob Moleschott used similar means. He
was born of a Dutch freethinker father, and
beginning in 1847 he taught physiology in
Heidelberg. He made the ideas of Feuerbach
and D. F. StrauB 40 mostly his own.
Moleschott's central scientific realization
was linking the law of the conservation of
matter, proposed by Lavoisier, with the law
of the conservation of energy proposed by
R. Mayer. From this linkage of matter with
energy, he concluded that all processes of
soul and mind are material-physiological in
nature. In his Lehre der Nahrungsmiltel—
Fur das Volk, AX Molleschott stated, "No
thought without phosphorus." which became
a slogan for many decades. Feuerbach. who
was one of his spiritual fathers, wrote the
following ironic review, much to
Molleschott 's irritation:
Man is what he eats [Der Mensch
ist. was er iBt]... Formerly we heard:
In the beginning was God. Today
we hear: In the beginning was the
belly... The old world made the
spirit the lather of matter, the new
one makes matter the father of the
spirit.
42
But Feuerbach 's harsh critique was power-
less against the popularity of Moleschott.
Unlike Vogt. Moleschott was a rather
sober man. who was no fighter for his ideas.
In 1852, in his book, Der Kreislauf des
Lebens (The Cycle ofLife), he proposed that
people abandon the use of cemeteries in fa-
vor of cremation, because cremation would
bring corpses back into the cycle of life as
fertilizer, instead of removing them from it
in tombs. This suggestion made Moleschott
one of the most controversial figures among
the German scientists. Harassed by the pub-
lic, he had to go abroad—but only as far as
Italy. In Italy there were a number of pro-
tests staged against Moleschott by Roman
Catholic students
—
probably none of whom
had ever read one of Moleschott's contro-
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versial books. He concentrated on his sci-
entific work in the second half of the nine-
teenth century. He died in 1893 in Rome,
after the city was no longer under papal gov-
ernment. His name became a sort of slogan
for a materialistic worldview, but he hardly
bothered, in fact, to defend materialism dur-
ing his time in Italy.
It was quite another mat-
ter with Ludwig Biichner
(1824-99), 4 - who fought all
his life for his materialistic
"Weltanschauung." In 1855,
four years before Darwin's
Origin of Species, he pub-
lished his book, Kraft und
Stoff{Force and Matter). By
1904, it had been reprinted
twenty-one times, and it was
translated into fifteen lan-
guages. Journals and reviews
criticized the book as
bungled, but it was a strong seller, nonethe-
less. The core of his materialistic thinking
centered around the idea of a purposeless
universe; the appearance of life and human-
kind were unplanned, chance events of na-
ture. The Darwinian description of evolu-
tion was helpful to him in defending his ma-
terialistic worldview. It is matter who thinks,
not the spirit. Human intellectual forces are
just a secretion of matter—an epiphenom-
enon.
This book by Biichner might be consid-
ered to be the popular, vulgarizing presenta-
tion of the opposition between faith and sci-
ence; it did not give a serious elaboration of
the tension between faith and knowledge, but
set them in opposition to one another in a
combative posture. To Biichner, as to most
of his readers, it was evident that force and
matter were concepts that might be inter-
changed. Thus, it is meaningless to speak
of "spiritual'" forces. The process of creatio
ex nihilo, as seen by Christian faith or by
any other religion, was to be refuted, since
matter is eternally conserved and cannot be
augmented nor diminished. The old
Lucreatian notions, with the help of the first
law of thermodynamics, experienced a
happy revival. Any limitation on space could
not be imagined—as Lucretius already said;
consequently, space must be infinite. All life
resides in organic matter, out of combina-
tions of cells that arose out of livins matter.
It would be a misunderstanding to read
the Roman Catholic teachings as a
reaction to the modern sciences of the
19th century. Rather, they have to be
seen as reactions to the materialistic
ideological usurpation of scientific
knowledge, a usurpation that itself
pretended to be scientific.
In the end, this world will be destroyed, be-
cause the laws of thermodynamics are unre-
lenting.
With the most absolute truth and
with the greatest scientific accuracy
can we say today: there is nothing
miraculous in this world.44
In such a universe, devoid of goal and
purpose, there is no room for any religion.
The universe is the product of the blind, un-
changeable necessity of the laws of matter.
Priests, then, are either ambitious or they are
charlatans; and all faithful people are fanat-
ics. Only ignorant laymen could believe in
a personal God Such conclusions were un-
avoidable for the educated person follow-
ing the ideas of Biichner.
Such perspectives are not really great
visions of the future. These days, when ma-
terialistic ideas are wide spread, the radical
striving for happiness demonstrates in many
ways the hopelessness and the futurelessness
of modern humanity. A century and a half
ago, Biichner had to realize that reading his
books turned people to melancholy. They
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complained about the hopelessness to which
his books exposed them. He tried to con-
sole his readers with the thought that stand-
ing under the merciless law of nature begets
feelings of humility, or of repose, out of
which grow self-contentment and self-re-
spect.
Not as the humble and submissive
slave of a supernatural master, nor as
the helpless toy in the hands of heav-
enly powers, but as the proud and free
son of Nature, understanding her laws
and knowing how to tutor them to his
own use, does the creature of modern
civilization, the Freethinker, appear.
the incarnation of the mightiest effort
of Nature.45
These are only a few examples of so-
called scientific ideologies of a generally ma-
terialistic color. There is no need to exam-
ine the materialistic faith of Ernst Heinrich
Haeckel, who tried eagerly to win members
for his Monist Union, 4 '' through which he
spread the Darwinist evolutionary doctrine.
It was no longer science that was proclaimed,
but a scientifically ensconced religion .
Thus, no clear-cut picture may be found,
with honest scientists in the service of truth
on one side, and on the other side, benighted
ecclesiastic theologians, still thinking in the
Dark Ages. Actually, up to the nineteenth
century, there was little fighting between sci-
ence and theology. The utterings of the
churches against science are rather to be
looked at as something like trench warfare:
one keeps the enemy at a distance without
really knowing much about it. This view
may make those antiscientific statements
more understandable from a human stand-
point,. From a theological standpoint,
though, they are more justified than the claim
of the proponents of science—or at least of
those who thought of themselves as the mis-
sionaries of a materialistic worldview,
preaching that science would be able to ex-
plain the world completely, once all the ma-
terial prerequisites of the material process
were discovered.
The late nineteenth century was deeply
impressed with these notions. Between the
teaching of the Roman Catholic Church, at
least, and science thinking in an evolution-
ary mode, a large gap had opened; and with
the faith in the superiority of science, there
was little doubt as to where truth was to be
found. This general belief is most succinctly
expressed by the answer of a fourteen-year-
old Harrow schoolboy. When asked, "What
did Darwin do?" he replied, "Darwin dis-
proved the Bible."
It might appear that Rome and the
Catholic Church only disapproved of the
idea of evolution, following a theology in
the style of "Roma locuta, causa finita"
[Rome has spoken, the case is closed]. But
no less a man than John Henry Newman
stated: "I cannot imagine. . .why Darwinism
should be considered inconsistent with
Catholic doctrine." 47 He made it quite clear
why he thought so:
There is as much want of simplicity
in the idea of distinct species as in that
of the creation of trees in full growth,
or rocks with fossils in them. I mean
that it is strange that monkeys should
be so like men. with no historical con-
nection between them, as that there
should be no course of facts by which
fossil bones got into rocks. The one
idea stands to the other as fluxions to
differentials... 1 will either go the
whole hog with Darwin, or. dispens-
ing with time and history altogether,
hold not only the theory of distinct
species but also that of the creation of
fossil-bearing rocks. 4 *
When the English anatomist and biolo-
gist St. George Jackson Mivart converted to
Catholicism and, therefore, had to leave Ox-
ford University, he taught in London at St.
Mary's Hospital Medical School and pub-
lished Lessons from Nature in 1876. He ac-
cepted the notion of evolution but argued
against Darwin's theory of mutation and se-
lection. Instead, he proposed an innate plas-
tic power of "individuation" that would ex-
plain the production of new species. 41 '
Huxley, as well as the Roman Catholic
Church, turned against Mivart in his attempt
to bridge the gap between religion and sci-
ence. This Church looked with growing dis-
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approval at his publications, and in 1892/93
they were put on the Index. When he pub-
lished a few journal articles in January 1900,
he was excommunicated by Herbert Cardi-
nal Vaughan. Some years after Mivart's
death, this judgment was nullified on the
ground that he was mentally ill at the end of
his life.
The ideas of Mivan were picked up by
others. The Dominican, M. D. Leroy, put
forward his version of them in his book
V Evolution restreinte aux especes
organiques. An American exposition fol-
lowed, by J. A. Zahm in his book. Dogma
and Evolution. In Belgium, Canon Henry
de Dorlodot taught quite positively on evo-
lution. 50 In France, Pierre Teilhard de
Chardin started to write on evolution during
World War I. It must be pointed out that, to
date, Teilhard has presented the most com-
prehensive essay integrating the world, un-
derstood as evolutionary, into theology. His
life, marked by his banishment from an aca-
demic career at the Catholic University of
Paris and his exile from Fiance, is well
known. 51
But these were only some isolated Ro-
man Catholic avant-gardes, fighting for a
positive understanding of evolution and of
science in general. In a wider view, neither
among the theologians nor among the sci-
entists was there any great readiness to talk
with one another. Theologians liked to use
arguments from the realm of science, but
quite often without any real understanding
and mostly for apologetic puiposes. A nice
example is a professor of dogmatics named
J. Bautz, who taught in Minister. He used
the example of volcanos to demonstrate the
existence of hell in the center of the earth," 2
an argument that exposed him to general ridi-
cule and earned him the nickname
"Hollenbautz." That being said, it should
be acknowledged that some of the so-called
scientific claims were no less ridiculous
—
for example, Haeckel's declaration. "We
now know that the soul is the sum of the
plasma movements in the ganglion cells."
Only in Haeckel's case, nobody laughed.
The profound abyss between Christian
believers and those believing in science was
well illustrated by Dostoyevsky in his novel,
The Possessed,53 in the episode about a young
lieutenant who had attacked his superior in
a rage, biting him into the shoulder. This is
the description of his settling into his rural
quarters:
[He had] thrown two icons out of the
window and hacked one of them
with a hatchet. On the shrine in his
room he had placed the books of
Vogt, Moleschott and Biichner and
had lighted church candles before
them.
In view of the harshness of the contro-
versy, which to this day has not totally dis-
appeared, some vestiges of hope for better
relations sometimes appear among theolo-
gians as well as among scientists. It is some-
what astonishing that there never was a for-
mal condemnation of the theory of evolu-
tion by the magisterium of the Roman Catho-
lic Church. Vatican I made no explicit deci-
sion against the doctrine of evolution; it es-
sentially just repeated the principle that there
is no possibility of a contradiction between
faith and science. The most respected theolo-
gians of that time were nevertheless con-
vinced that they had to refute the idea that
the human body and the human race had
arisen through evolution, and they declared
those who held such opinions to be heretics.
Thus, it really is amazing that the efforts of
Monsignor Benigni to have evolution con-
demned by the Roman Catholic Church as
heresy in 1925 did not succeed—thanks to
the opposition of Cardinals Ernie, Mercier,
Bourne and Maffi. 54 This did not deter Car-
dinal Ruffini and other theologians of the
"integrist" camp—as they are known in ret-
rospect—from defending, up into the 1950s,
the opinion that the human body was cre-
ated directly by God and did not arise through
of evolution. The last defensive statement
of any importance to this question was the
encyclical, Humani generis,55 which admit-
ted the possibility that the human body may
have arisen by evolution, but with the restric-
tion that human beimis must have had a
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monogenetic origin, that is, an origin in a
single pair of parents.
Today it might be stated that, at least
within the Roman Catholic Church, there is
no longer any resistance to the notion of evo-
lution. With the publication of the writings
of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, which began
upon his death in 1955, there was quite a
stirring of interest and great discussion, most
of it only inside the churches. Vatican II.
and most especially the pastoral constitution,
was influenced by his thought, even to the
very choice of words, if we are to trust the
commentary of Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger
on Gaudium et Spes (the Second Vatican
Council, 1962-65). It is evident that
Teilhard's ideas have not, even to this day,
been adequately received, neither in science
nor in theology. Theologians like to quote
him. especially to show that there is no in-
compatibility between Christian faith and
evolutionary theory. But mostly they are
contented just with this statement, without
asking the hard questions about what kind
of fundamental changes in theology will fol-
low if this world is an evolving creation.
Thus, no clear-cut picture may be found
\
with honest scientists in the service of
truth on one side, and on the other side,
benighted ecclesiastic theologians, still
thinking in the Dark Ages.
Today, the battle around evolution has
practically ceased. But this does not mean
that any fundamental changes in the presen-
tation of the doctrine of creation have been
made in the theological manuals; this does
not differ essentially from that in the manu-
als of the last century. By having pushed
the process of demythologization ever fur-
ther (most often combined with a growing
sociologization), theology and faith largely
got rid of the difficulty with confronting the
knowledge of science. Even more, trans-
cendalization has opened up a region in
which, by definition, no empirical proof is
possible. Except among the fundamental-
ists in some regions of the United States and
Australia, where they exercise some influ-
ence as "creationists," and except for the few
dispersed integrists in the Roman Catholic
world, no theologian today is seriously con-
cerned about scientific theories such as the
theory of evolution—though exceptions do
make the rule.
The existence, side by side, of these two
realms of knowledge—which consider one
another as mutually irrelevant—is not with-
out consequences. With science, the narrow-
ing of the horizon of cognition to the em-
pirical, experimentally provable—and/or to
the mathematically expressible—has led to
the incapacity of science to speak about the
spiritual dimension with competence. This
is clearly demonstrated by experimental psy-
chology, for example, which is barely able
to recognize the nuances of the spiritual. The
innumerable theories of human psychology
that keep appearing, and the schools linked
with these theories, may be sufficient indi-
cations of this state of affairs.
It might be said that the
controversy today is no
longer maintained by
strongly opposed positions
on either side. Attempts to
deliver a theory of science as
a secure basis of the sciences
have not succeeded with a re-
ally convincing proposition.
The discussion has withdrawn to the ques-
tion of true and false judgments, and this has
given scientists a much clearer feeling for
the preliminary nature of their knowledge
and especially of their vvorldview—if they
dare to try one. The claim to refute religion
or faith is alien to most scientists of today,
even though there might be a few grandchil-
dren of the Haeckels and the Drapers around.
The fight is over, but there is no victor.
The fighters lost interest in their fight with-
out overcoming their opponents. The inter-
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est of science in refuting theology, with few
exceptions, no longer exists. Nor does the-
ology feel itself menaced by science; theol-
ogy generally considers science to be irrel-
evant—and therewith, the theory of evolu-
tion.
Looking at the present situation, the
whole fight between theology and science
appears rather superfluous. The idea of evo-
lution was used, as Haeckel intended, as a
weapon to destroy Christianity and all other
religions. Unfortunately, this fight stopped
theological thinking from seriously address-
ing the question of the importance of the
process of evolution for the Christian faith.
Even now, thinkers get stuck in an apolo-
getic, defensive stance, which inhibits a posi-
tive integration of the evolutionary charac-
ter of the universe into a theology of cre-
ation.
On the other hand, it must also be stated
that the inability of the scientists to liberate
themselves from their materialistic preju-
dices has trapped them in the rationally un-
acceptable theory of neo-Darwinism, which
seems to be breaking up today—but only
very slowly.
The question of whether, in the long run,
theology can survive while continuing to ig-
nore the results of science, especially evo-
lution, has yet to be answered. This is a ques-
tion that cannot be treated by giving an his-
torical overview such as this. The answer
will be found, rather, by starting from
theologically given presuppositions, e.g.,
from the article of the creed, that this uni-
verse—which is explored by science— is
God's creation.
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Endnotes:
1. Some philosopher or other worker in
the field of human sciences might look
with dismay at the idea that human
knowledge itself is a part and continuation
of the evolutionary process. But this is an
evident fact inasmuch as the human being
has never ceased to be a part of the
evolutionary process. It is not a matter of
nature on the one side, humanity on the
other. The latter is a part of nature, and
nature's process of becoming did not come
to a standstill with the human being.
2. Chang, p. 204.
3. Ibid., pp. 743-5.
4. Exceptions like Whitehead and his
school of process philosophers, or Teilhard
de Chardin or Bergson confirm this
statement rather than contradict it.
5. Cf. Giambattista Vico (1688-1744),
for example, who belonged to one such
clandestine group in Naples for some time;
his ideas, largely exploited in Europe by
plagiarism, show clear resonances with
Lucretius.
6. Tielhard de Chardin, pp. 109-32.
7. Annus Mundi—Year of the World; cf
General Tables of the Fasti Catholici or
Fasti Temporis perpetiii from 1 a.m. of the
year 4004 b.c. to 6004 a.m. of the year
6000 a.d.
8. This similarity had been already noted
by Galen, whose knowledge about
anatomy was largely based on the dissec-
tion of apes. Only during the late Middle
Ages—by order of the Pope—did anato-
mists begin to abandon the taboo concern-
ing the dissection of human coipses.
9. His theory was based on an atomistic
dualism: all matter possesses a certain
degree of sensibility, intelligence and
memory. The influence of Lucretius and
Vico are noticeable here.
10. This history comprises 44 volumes!
11. Blumenbach, Collectio\ Institu-
tions, vol. 4.
12. Lamarck.
13. He also introduced the term "biol-
ogy" into science.
14. There are many points that remain
unanswered by the purely neo-Darwinist
scenario. The highly complicated and
complex structures in many features of
existant fauna, including the human
species, evidently transcend currently
proposed explanations.
15. Chief of the tumor cell biology
laboratory, National Cancer Institute.
16. Institut Pasteur, Paris. He sent to
Gallo a specimen of the French isolate of
the AIDS virus that Gallo claims to have
discovered.
17. Cuvier.
18. This work was translated into Italian
and French and was republished twice
(1740. 1757).
19. Kant (1797), A 365-6. note.
20. Ibid. Cf., "Matter, which is the basal
stuff of all things, is... bound to certain
laws. Left to them, it must produce, by
necessity, beautiful combinations. It does
not have any freedom to deviate from this
plan of perfection. Since it is thus in the
state of being submitted to the wisest
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intention, thus it must be placed by
necessity into such harmonic conditions by
a first cause that rules over it, and there-
fore, there is a God, just because nature,
even in chaos, cannot be otherwise than
regular and orderly." Ibid.. XXIX-XXX.
21.Ibid.,AXXXIV-XXXV.
22. Akademie Ausgabe T.8. 54.
23. Kant (1797), A 376.
24. Hegel, par. 339.
25. Ibid., par. 249.
26. The first edition sold out in one day.
27. The opus was published anony-
mously. The author was identified only in
1884, years after Darwin's death.
28. Historical sketch from the sixth
edition, p. 58.
29. Cf. selected articles in Hinske.
30. He was not one of the really great
scientists of his time. Certainly his books
sold enormously well—the same is true
today for the popularizing works of writers
of a materialistic bent. Vogt's book were
considered to be outdated in the first half
of the twentieth century, especially in as
much as his defense of a materialistic
worldview is concerned. The 1934 edition
of the encyclopedia, Der Grope Black-
balls, still devoted seventeen lines to him,
though more recent editions stopped
mentioning him.
31.Chadwick, p. 167.
32. Draper, pp. 32 Iff.
33. Omncs religionis veritates ex nativa
humanae rationis vi derivant; hinc ratio
est princeps norma, qua homo cognitio-
nem omnium cuiuscunque generis verita-
tum assequi possit ac debeat. (D. 1704)
34. Divina revelatio est imperfecta et
idcirco snbiecta continuo et indifinito
progressui, qui humanae rationis
progressui respondeat. (D. 1705)
35. Si quis praeter materiam nihil esse
affirmare non erubuerit: Anathema sit.
(D. 1802)
36. Si quis dixerit, res finitas turn
corporeas turn spirituales out saltern
spirituales e divina substantia emanasse,
—ant divinam essentiam sui manifesta-
tione vel evolutione fieri omnia,—aut
denique Deum esse ens universale seu
indefinitum quod esse determinando
constituat rerum universitatem in genera,
species et individua distinctam: A. S. (D.
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